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Expert: Some people say that the process of 
democratization, as a mechanism for fully 
engaging citizens in the running of their 
countries, and the establishment of an elite 
are mutually exclusive. To what extent is an 
elite really needed at this stage in history?
Volodymyr Nikitin: In the West, the word 
“elite” is avoided at public hearings, as 
a concept that belongs to the past. It is 
generally used only in relation to countries 
that are still developing, including Ukraine. 
In EU countries, the elite long ago formed 
itself and not much in the way of upheaval 
is anticipated in its circles. That is why 
European politicians can quietly discuss 
democracy and the concept of a society of 
equal opportunities. 
First, it’s important to distinguish between 
an elite and privileged individuals. 
In Ukraine, these concepts have been 
blurred: the elite are seen as those who 
have power and a commensurate range 
of privileges—fancy houses, stores and 
schools. I understand “elite” as meaning 
something else. An elite is not those who 
have power, and even less those who have 
privileges. It is those who are responsible 
for the program of transforming society, who 
are responsible for the development and 
preservation of the nation. How did a simple 
monk like Serhiy Radonezhskiy manage to 
have greater authority than even a duke 
during his time? [Serhiy Radonezhskiy was 
a 14th century church- and statesman. Ed.] 
By himself providing an example for others 
to follow and refusing “power and pelf.” But 
even more importantly, he had a vision of 
how to build Rus’, which means that he was 
able to formulate principles and values for 
the country.
To be part of the elite is to carry out a public 
function, not to depend on a specific group 
of people who are in power. Ukrainian 
politicians do not fully constitute an elite, 
because they lack a sense of responsibility. 
Only those who take upon themselves 
responsibility for the development of 
their society and who are capable of 
demonstrating this responsibility can gain 
the kind of authority that will allow them to 
influence public awareness.
Е: What do you mean by “taking on 
responsibility”? By what mechanism can 
responsibility be established and taken on?
VN: In the first place, it means acting on the 
basis of principles and not circumstances. 
When there was a status-based concept of 
elite and the nobility took on this role, there 
was a clear mechanism for verifying whether 
a person lived by specific principles or not. 
There was a concept of honor and everything 
was decided by duels. Principles are formed 
based on the emergence of new models of 
behavior in a society. In Ukraine today, you 
can’t name a single leader who is prepared to 
live according to any principles that can be 
put into action.
Е: Perhaps they are forming new models of 
behavior at this very time…
VN: It’s one or the other: either you have 
principles, or you don’t. Principles are 
established in groups. Individuality is only 
a reflection of group behavior. In time, 
there appears a group of people who begin 
to understand why they are not satisfied 
and begin to present their own vision of 
how society should work. Eventually, these 
principles are adopted more widely in the 
society.
Е: In a modern society, is this mostly the 
group that is in power?
VN: Not necessarily. This group can contain 
people from various walks of life. Society is 
not unitary—its structure shifts and an elite 
might appear, say, among groups of younger 
people or, like the US in the Sixties, when a 
group of people appeared who proposed new 
forms of communal life. They never came to 
power, but they had an impact on society.
In Ukraine, there are probably already some 
groups emerging who behave somehow 
differently. The main thing is to notice these 
groups. In the modern information society, 
they don’t even have to be territorial in 
nature. We live in an on-line society and 
role models for behavior come from the mass 
media and movies. For instance, Hollywood 
always acts in conjunction with US national 
interests and the values of the American 
people.
Е: If we live in the information age and our 
society is under the influence of the culture 
of more advanced countries, while these 
groups form without any territorial ties, then 
perhaps the notion of a national elite is not 
necessary and it doesn’t play that important 
a role?
VN: There are some who believe in the 
theory that the world contains only a few 
elites: a European one, an American and an 
Arabic one. These elites are concentrated 
in the most developed countries in these 
regions and influence all other states. 
Supporters of this theory claim that, when 
other countries are information societies, 
including Ukraine, there is little chance of 
a new elite appearing. Since there are no 
groups of people who might propose a social 
development program that matches global 
dimensions, those states are little more than 
the interstices of external interests. I don’t 
exactly subscribe to this point-of-view. 
I think that Ukraine is far from hopeless.
Society develops on three levels. At the lowest 
level is the buzz of ordinary life: people are 
unhappy with a situation and they want 
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privileges and freedom. In Ukraine, you see 
not just the energy of human movement, but, 
with every passing year, more and more people 
who clearly understand how they would like 
to live. At the lowest level, this energy is not 
organized, and if it is not given some shape, 
then you end up with the same old “Russian 
rebellion, raging and ruthless.” By form, 
I mean the social organization of people. 
It gets set in motion at the level of ideas. 
And in Ukraine, so far, nothing has appeared: 
the Church is not producing such ideas and 
there are no people with authority sufficient 
to the task of rebuilding this society. And even 
if some individuals are bringing forth new 
ideas, those who know of them can be counted 
on the fingers of one hand.
In order to create and carry through the 
project of the Ukrainian state, people 
need to be trained. Before our team, 
led by philosopher and teacher Grigoriy 
Shchedrovytskiy, began to work on 
establishing the Togliatti Academy [in 
2000–2005, the author worked as head of 
the Department of the Humanities at the 
International Academy of Business and 
Banking in Togliatti, Russia. Ed.], we traveled 
around the country, meeting with governors, 
politicians and other leaders with whom 
we discussed possible reforms. It was then 
that we understood that these people 
were hopeless—that they were completely 
incapable of changing anything within the 
government bureaucracy. We came to a 
simple conclusion: we needed to train a new 
generation of people who would be able to 
take on responsibility for carrying out reforms 
and would train others who could do this. 
That’s why we decided to focus on the system 
of education.
Е: Do you mean that a political elite cannot 
ensure a breakthrough in development? 
VN: The post-soviet elite cannot be 
responsible for breakthrough reforms. Our 
basic problem lies in the fact that we have 
not separated the past (soviet) from the 
new (democratic). The country’s leaders just 
don’t see this temporary border and they still 
operate according to the soviet system of 
management. When I lecture to state officials 
about the difference between soviet methods 
of managing and democratic methods, I can 
see that this is news to them. The same is 
true at the city level, at the oblast level, at 
the national level.
At the moment, we still don’t have new forms 
of social organization—or, if they are there, 
no one knows about them. There are no new 
approaches to education and there is no new 
understanding of the role of the individual 
within society. All of Ukraine is that same 
soviet social security project, only under new 
circumstances. The same soviet stereotypes 
still operate, even in the formulation of a 
national idea. Because what the dissidents 
and nationalists were working on, although 
it was aimed against the soviet reality, was 
developed within the soviet framework and 
according to soviet rules. It has served its 
purpose. In the context of an independent 
state, though, it is destructive.
We now have a country that has to be built 
anew. The concept of this country should 
be consolidated by its citizenry and be 
based on their overall heritage, and not on a 
division of this heritage into Ukrainian and 
non-Ukrainian. And if we share this heritage 
with the Russians, there’s nothing especially 
terrible about that. We won’t become less 
independent as a result, but we will definitely 
be the richer for it.
Е: So you’re saying that, so far, we’ve been 
recreating a power elite inside a closed 
circle…
VN: Until now, we have essentially been 
recreating the soviet nomenclature—and 
it doesn’t much matter what you call it. 
Ukraine’s current political elite has no vision 
of the future. Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, 
had his own sense of direction. After leading 
the country out of the hole it found itself 
in during the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
he was able to rebuild America and show the 
country where it was going. At the same time, 
Hollywood began to illustrate the American 
Dream. Our politicians don’t see the future 
and don’t understand how it differs from the 
past. Many of them don’t have the most basic 
democratic skills. But the main thing is that 
they do not feel responsible to anyone and 
they don’t want to take any responsibility 
on themselves, not even before their own 
electorates. 
Е: In forming a new elite, should we use 
foreign examples as a basis? For instance, 
Oleh Rybachuk, the former Deputy Premier 
for European integration in the Tymoshenko 
Cabinet, wanted his team to consist exclusively 
of graduates from western schools. 
VN: That’s completely wrong. We’ve already 
gone through that. The western approach to 
education suits the West. In our situation, it 
doesn’t work. When we were working on the 
Togliatti Academy of Administration, we sent 
our first seniors to study in the US. But when 
they came back, we were unable to hire any 
of them to work for us. The way things are 
here, they were unable to carry out any of 
their assignments. They ceased to be able to 
understand reality here and began to rely on 
leverage that we simply don’t have, although 
it does work over there. We need a system of 
professional development that will make use 
of western experience but will be built on 
our own models, on our people, and on those 
occasional intermediaries who know both 
these worlds.
Е: So you consider Ukraine far from hopeless 
and believe there’s a chance that individuals 
will emerge who will take responsibility for 
the country’s development. What conditions 
are needed for that to happen?
VN: I’ve already said what the first condition is: 
activism among the masses. And that we have 
already brilliantly seen in Ukraine. Then, you 
need an environment where there is enough 
freedom for individual and group talent to 
express itself. Freedom, which is different from 
being free (maybe the free kozak will toss the 
duchess overboard, and maybe he won’t; it’s 
up to him), is a contract of mutual limitations, 
that is, you can establish rules by which you all 
agree to live. Ukraine is currently “free” of this 
kind of rules, yet they need to be established. 
What we see happening in our political 
process right now is like that free kozak. 
Yet these political processes are completely 
normal—provided that, in the end, a system 
of limitations is adopted and the rules of the 
game are made clear through the necessary 
legislation. But if this doesn’t happen, then 
what we have is no more than a political circus.
Е: What will this state-building start with? 
VN: We want to get into the European Union, 
but without bothering to establish European 
values. We give the impression that we want 
to go there in order to remove responsibility 
for our own future. Because it means that 
others will make decisions for us, and those 
decisions will be better. But the EU won’t take 
us in until we learn to take responsibility for 
our own territory. Ukraine is like a patchwork 
quilt that still needs to be completely stitched 
together. The question is, how to do this: 
on the basis of a unitary country or on the 
basis of one in which the regions want to live 
together. If the latter, then we need to let 
them have the opportunity to indicate where 
their interests lie. So far, we’ve been following 
a policy of equalizing the oblasts. We are 
afraid of federalism, as we are not prepared for 
the idea that every region could have its own 
development strategy.
I think that, in the end, the process will 
start at the bottom, from the cities and the 
regions. Ukraine differs from other post-
soviet countries in that no interest group 
is able to subordinate another. As long as 
this equilibrium is maintained, so that Rinat 
Akhmetov can’t gobble up Ihor Kolomoiskiy, 
or the President the Verkhovna Rada, then the 
possibility for establishing an open society and 
development remains. But as soon as someone 
swallows someone else and begins to run 
everything, all chances will be lost. 
The complete text of the interview can be found 
at http://www.expert.ua/articles/8/0/3858/ 
(in Russian). For additional information, you 
can contact Mr. Nikitin by phone at (380-44) 
484-4400 or via e-mail at vnikitin@icps.kiev.ua.
icps newsletter is a weekly publication of the International Centre for Policy Studies, delivered by electronic mail.
To be included in the distribution list, contact the ICPS publications department at marketing@icps.kiev.ua or call (380-44) 484-4400.
icps newsletter editor Olha Lvova (olvova@icps.kiev.ua). Phone: (380-44) 484-4400.
English text editor L.A. Wolanskyj. Articles may be reprinted with ICPS consent. icps newsletter on the web: http://icps.com.ua/eng/publications/nl.html
